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Domestic Support for the U.S. Rice Sector and the WTO:
Implications of the 2002 Farm Act
  
Introduction
U.S. rice farming has been highly influenced by federal legislation since the enactment of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.  A major objective of U.S. rice policy has been to support
farm price and income, thus providing a safety net for the rice sector.  U.S. rice policy and
support of the rice sector has long been a domestic issue but has also become a global issue since
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) obligated the U.S. to reduce trade
distorting domestic support, tariffs, and export subsidies on agricultural commodities.
Since enactment of the URAA, most of the support provided to the U.S. rice sector has been
through domestic support, rather than border policies or export subsidies.
 2  The World Trade
Organization (WTO) is interested in a country’s domestic support programs because policies that
support prices or subsidize production may encourage production and distort trade flows by
causing a decline in imports and/or an increase in exports.
On May 13, 2002 a new U.S. Farm Act, entitled the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002, was signed into law covering a period of 6 years. This legislation continues the marketing
loan program, 
3 planting flexibility, and direct payments available under the 1996 Farm Act, but
creates a new counter-cyclical payment (CCP). 
4  Direct payments replace the production
flexibility contract payments from the 1996 Act.  Counter-cyclical payments replace ad hoc
market loss assistance payments provided by Congress on an annual basis in 1998-2001.  The
new farm bill caused concern among many countries that the U.S. may not be able to meet its
current WTO AMS commitments.
                                                
2  Developed countries, such as the U.S., rely on domestic support policies to provide their producers with a safety
net.  U.S. rice tariffs are very low and do not facilitate the operation of the domestic support program.  The U.S. has
not used export subsidies for rice since 1995.
3  Compared to the 1996 Farm Act, additional commodities are eligible for marketing loan benefits: peanuts, wool
and mohair, honey, small chickpeas, lentils, and dry peas.
4  Soybeans, minor oilseeds, and peanuts are now eligible for direct and counter-cyclical payments.                                                                                                                                                        2
A crucial question is whether income support for rice will increase substantially under the new
Act.   Also, will domestic support for U.S. rice expand beyond the commodity specific “de
minimis” exemption and thus contribute to the U.S. Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)?
What does the Doha Development agenda suggest for future levels of domestic support?
Objectives
This paper describes the criteria used by the URAA in classifying different policies as trade
distorting or non-distorting, it identifies U.S. rice income support policies and how they are
notified to the WTO (green, amber, or blue box), and it determines rice’s contribution to the U.S.
AMS.  Next, income support projections from the 2002 U.S. Farm Act are presented and
compared to income support from the 1996 Farm Act to determine potential effects to rice
income support. Lastly, alternative marketing loan benefit reduction scenarios are examined to
identify their effects to U.S. rice sector revenue.
Domestic Support and the URAA
The URAA distinguishes between domestic support policies that are considered production or
trade distorting (“amber box”) and non- or minimally-distorting (“green box”), and requires
WTO member countries to annually report all support provided to domestic agricultural
producers. 
5  The total value of support related to policies in the “amber box” is referred to as the
AMS.  Countries agree to keep their AMS from exceeding limits set forth in the URAA. The
maximum commitment level for U.S. “amber box” support in 1995 was $23.1 billion, which
declined to current ceiling at $19.1 billion in 2000.  These support ceilings represent a 20 percent
reduction from the 1986-88 base support level over the implementation period of 1995-2000 for
developed countries (13 percent from the base over the implementation period of 1995-2004 for
developing countries) (Hoffman and Dohlman, 2001).
Amber box policies subject to reduction include price supports, marketing loans, direct payments
based on current production and price levels, input subsidies, and certain subsidized loan
                                                
5   Definitions of specific trade policy terms can be found at the following website:
(www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/WTO/Glossaries.htm).                                                                                                                                                        3
programs.  Individual commodity support has flexibility from the concept of aggregate
measurement of support, since the reduction commitments do not apply to specific commodities
but to the total value of support for a country.  If support for a specific commodity is equal to or
less than 5 percent of its production value (10 percent for developing countries), it is not counted
towards the AMS limits.  This “de minimis” exemption provides some flexibility to a country in
the design of its domestic support policies for specific commodities.
Amber box policies that are non-commodity specific and subject to reduction include, for
example, water subsidies, grazing program outlays, insurance indemnities less producer
premiums paid, credit programs, crop market loss, and multi-year crop disaster.  The “de
minimis” exemption is equal to or less than 5 percent of the total value of all agriculture
production.  This compares to the commodity-specific exemption, which is equal to or less than
5 percent of the commodity’s value of production.
Direct producer payments under certain production-limiting programs (referred to as “blue box”
policies) are exempt from reduction (not included in the current AMS) as long as they satisfy
specific criteria.  Specifically, the program must be production limiting, with payments based on
fixed area and yield, or on 85 percent or less of the base level of production or fixed number of
livestock.
Support from policies with minimal impacts on trade or production (green box policies) is also
excluded from the AMS.   Examples of these policies include public stockholding, natural
disaster relief, marketing and promotion, inspection, extension services, pest and disease control,
food aid, and research.  They also include producer payments that are minimally distorting to
production, such as certain forms of de-coupled income support not tied to production, assistance
to help producers make structural adjustments, and direct payments under environmental,
conservation, and resource retirement programs.
U.S. Domestic Support for Rice                                                                                                                                                        4
National legislation has affected and shaped the U.S. rice sector over the past seven decades.  
6
Price support, income support, and supply control programs made major contributions to the
safety-net programs for the U.S. rice sector.  A more complete history of U.S. rice support can be
found in (Setia et. al., 1994) and (Schnepf and Just, 1995).   Beginning with the inception of the
URAA in 1995, U.S. rice policy is examined to determine what kinds of income support policies
were available to U.S. rice producers and to determine how they were notified to the WTO.
During the implementation period of the URAA, 1995-2002, domestic support provided to the
U.S. rice sector has come from income support specified by different farm Acts, ad hoc
assistance provided by Congress in the form of emergency and supplemental support, subsidized
crop and revenue insurance, and trade promotion programs such as export credit guarantees.
During 1995, the first year of the URAA implementation period, the U.S. rice sector received
most of its support under provisions of the 1990 Farm Act.  A bulk of the support came from
target price deficiency payments, as no marketing loan benefits were made that year (Fig. 1).
The deficiency payments paid to rice producers in crop year 1995 totaled $471 million,
representing about 22 percent of sector revenue.  This support was notified to the WTO as “blue
box”.
1996 Farm Act
The 1996 FAIR Act was in effect for most of the URAA implementation period and this Act
significantly changed the price and income support mechanisms for rice and other grains.  The
income support program of target price deficiency payments was eliminated along with the ARP,
50/85-92 and NFA/OFA programs.  The Act established a seven-year payment contract for
eligible farmers and ranchers.  Program participants were eligible for production flexibility
contract (PFCs) payments.  In 2000/01, the PFC payment rate was $2.60 per cwt.  Participants
received payments on 85 percent of their contract acreage and the program yield was frozen at
mid-1980 levels.  Under this system, all program crop producers were provided nearly complete
flexibility in planting decisions.  However, flexibility hasn’t had a huge impact on rice acreage
because most crops do not do well on land devoted to rice.  Owners of rice base acreage received
                                                
6 Definitions of specific farm policy terms can be found at the following website:
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a contract payment whether they produced rice or not.  Thus, production decisions were
determined primarily by expected market returns relative to other crops.
Production flexibility contract (PFC) payments for rice meet specific WTO criteria for “green
box” payments.  The amount of a producer’s PFC payments depends on past program
participation and does not depend on current market prices, production, or resources.  The U.S.
rice sector received annual PFC payments that ranged from $348.0 million to $499.8 million
between 1996 and 2002 (USDA, 2003 b).
In addition to annual PFC payments, a marketing loan program was provided to U.S. rice
producers.  Producer support under the marketing loan program included both loan deficiency
payments and marketing loan gains.  Payment rates were based on the difference between the
announced weekly world price and the established loan rate, with payments possible when the
announced world rice price is less than the loan rate.
Payments received by farmers from the marketing loan program vary from year to year.  From
1995/96 through 1997/98, the announced world price exceeded the loan rate of $6.50 per cwt., so
no marketing loan payments were made.  However, in early 1999 when world prices began to
fall, marketing loan payments were available.  A steady decline in world rice prices pushed these
payments to more than a $1 per cwt. in August 1999, and by the end of the 1999/2000 crop year,
they exceeded $3 per cwt.  For 1999, government payments for the rice marketing loan program
totaled $395 million  (fig. 1) (USDA, 2003 b).
A rice producer may purchase commodity certificates in exchange for the outstanding loan
collateral at or before loan maturity.  The commodity certificate can be purchased at the
repayment rate in effect on the date of the request.  Any market gain realized from a commodity
certificate exchange is not applied to payment limitations but is considered income to the
producer. These provisions enable producers who are facing payment limits an opportunity to
benefit from the lower repayment rates.  Certificate gains for rice ranged from $57 million in
1999 to $303 million in 2002.                                                                                                                                                        6
Marketing loan program benefits, including commodity certificate gains, for U.S. rice were
included under the URAA “amber box” category.  The producer benefits depend on the level of
current rice production and the announced world price for rice relative to the commodity loan
rate.  Recent research shows that levels of realized per-unit rice revenues facilitated by marketing
loans have exceeded commodity loan rates when crop prices are relatively low (Westcott and
Price, 2001).  This finding is likely caused by producers receiving program benefits when prices
are seasonally low (and benefits high) and selling their crop later in the marketing year when
prices have risen.  The historical above-loan-rate level of realized per-unit revenues likely
influences expectations of per-unit revenues in subsequent years.  This policy effect raises
producers’ expected net returns and can lead to increased production and exports, depending on
the cross-commodity effects.
Increased world rice production in the mid-1990s caused world prices to fall and stocks to rise
(fig. 2).  In response to low commodity prices and other problems such as weather-related
disasters, the U.S. Congress provided supplemental market loss (MLA) assistance payments to
recipients of PFC payments in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
7 Emergency rice payments for 1998
equaled approximately 50 percent of that year’s PFC payment or $1.45 per cwt.  In 1999 and
2000 contract owners received MLA payments equal to the 1999 PFC payment rate of $2.82 per
cwt.  The payment rate for 2001 was $2.39 per cwt.
MLA payments have been notified to the WTO as non-commodity specific “amber box”
payments.  Each producer’s MLA payment is determined by past program participation, not by
current production, but in response to current market price experiences.  MLA payments do not
meet “green box” criteria because they were given in response to low market prices.
Government payments rose substantially after 1997/98, a result of declining world prices
triggering marketing loan benefits (loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains) and ad
hoc and market loss assistance payments authorized by congress.  For example, in 1997/98 the
only payments mad to the rice sector were production flexibility contract payments of $448                                                                                                                                                        7
million.  By 1999/2000 all government rice payments exceeded $1.3 billion (table 3).  These
included $466 million in PFC’s, $401 million in LDPs, MLGs, and commodity certificate gains,
and $465 million in MLAs (fig. 1).  Government support represented about 22 percent of total
rice sector revenue in crop years 1995 and 1996, but beginning in 1998 this proportion rose
substantially and reached 62 percent in 2001/02 and 2002/03.  However, as mentioned
previously, not all of this support is included in the “amber box”.
Crop Yield and Revenue Insurance
Producers of specific crops can purchase insurance policies at a subsidized rate under Federal
crop insurance programs (USDA, b).  These insurance policies make indemnity payments to rice
producers based on current losses related to either below-average yields (crop yield insurance) or
below-average revenue (revenue insurance) (table 1).  Between 1995 and 2002, 55 to 97 percent
of the acres planted to rice have used some form of crop or revenue insurance.  WTO member
countries report the indemnity minus producer premium, or net indemnity, to the WTO as an
insurance subsidy.  Based on these criteria, domestic support for rice crop/revenue insurance has
ranged from -$1.1 million to $41.1 million between 1995 and 2002.
Crop insurance influences production decisions and therefore prices.  Government crop
insurance subsidies are likely to alter producer behavior because they lower the cost of
purchasing coverage.  The cost reduction represents a benefit to producers that raises expected
returns per acre and provides an incentive to expand area in crop production.  Research results
suggest that acreage impacts of subsidized crop insurance are small.  Planted area to rice was
estimated to rise by 1 percent and prices were expected to decline by 3 percent, due to these
subsidies (Young, Vandeveer, and Schnepf, 2001).
The benefits received by rice producers from the crop and revenue insurance programs are
considered to be production distorting “amber box” programs under the URAA.  Since these
programs are administered using non-commodity specific (generic) provisions, they count
                                                                                                                                                            
7  The Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003 was signed into law on February 20, 2003.  One program contained in the
Act is the Crop Disaster Program.  Damages must be in excess of 35 percent for either 2001 or 2002 crop.
Producers must choose one year but not both to establish their loss.  Program signup begins June 6, 2003.                                                                                                                                                        8
toward the U.S.’s AMS only if total benefits from all non-commodity specific “amber box”
programs exceed 5 percent of the total value of U.S. agricultural production.
Export Assistance and Promotional Programs
U.S. rice exports benefit from U.S. food aid programs, export credit guarantees and market
promotion. The U.S. donates rice to needy countries either bilaterally or through the World Food
Program, and sells rice on concessional credit terms.  USDA currently provides food aid abroad
through three channels: the Public Law 480  (P.L. 480) program, the Section 416 (b) program,
and the Food for Progress program (Childs, 2001).  U.S. rice exports under the food aid
programs totaled about 400,000 tons in fiscal 2000, about 18 percent of U.S. rice exports.
USDA provides export credit guarantees for commercial financing of U.S. agricultural exports.
The CCC administers export credit guarantee programs for commercial financing of U.S.
agricultural exports to buyers in countries where financing may not be available without CCC
guarantees.  For fiscal 1999 and 2000, annual U.S. rice exports shipped under credit guarantees
averaged more than 200,000 tons, about 8 percent of total U.S. rice exports.  Some countries
want to treat guaranteed export credits as export subsidies and would like to discipline them (or
restrict their use).  The U.S. proposed the establishment of a set of rules to govern export credit
activity by WTO members (USDA, 2002 b).
USDA funds different programs that promote and develop foreign markets for U.S. agricultural
products (USDA, g).  For example, the Market Access Program (MAP) helps finance
promotional activities such as consumer promotions, market research, technical assistance, and
trade servicing.  The Foreign Market Development Program (FMD) aids in the developing,
maintaining, and expanding of long-term export markets for U.S. agricultural products.  Some
other programs available include the Facility Guarantee Program (FGP) and the Quality Samples
Program (QSP).  The FGP provides payment guarantees to facilitate the financing of goods and
services exported from the U.S. to improve or establish agriculture-related facilities in emerging
markets.  The QSP helps U.S. agricultural trade organizations provide product samples to
potential importers.                                                                                                                                                        9
Rice’s Contribution to the U.S. AMS
The U.S. has notified the WTO concerning its AMS expenditures for 1995 through 1999.
However, in only one year, 1999, have rice “amber box” expenditures contributed to the U.S.
AMS.  The “de minimis” exemption excluded rice “amber box” expenditures from the AMS in
1995-1998.  The total value of  “amber box” support, mostly marketing loan benefits, was less
than 5 percent of the value of U.S. rice production for most years.  Ad hoc MLA payments and
crop insurance subsidies are reported as non-commodity specific “amber box” and the sum of
these non-commodity specific expenditures are subject to a  “de minimis” exemption equal to 5
percent of the total U.S. production of all commodities. 
8
Based on U.S. WTO notifications for 1999, the most recent notification, rice “amber box”
support consisted mostly of marketing loan benefits, followed by smaller amounts for
commodity loan interest subsidies (table 2).  Rice marketing loan benefits continued to rise in
crop years 2000/01, 2001/02 and 2002/03 because of declining market prices (table 3).  Other
support, such as PFC payments, are notified as “green box.”  Crop insurance and market loss
assistance payments were reported as “amber box” non-commodity specific support but were not
counted in the AMS because of the non-commodity specific “de minimis” exemption.
Projected Income Support from the 2002 Farm Act
A crucial question is whether income support for rice will increase substantially under the new
Act. 
9  To determine whether income support expenditures will increase, it is necessary to project
                                                
8   Items that contributed most to the U.S. AMS in 1998 were price supports for dairy, sugar, and peanuts and
marketing loan benefits from cotton, oilseeds, and other grains.
9 As mentioned previously, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 caused concern globally, as many
countries wondered whether the U.S. would continue to meet its current WTO AMS commitments.  However, the
new Act contains a provision that assures that the United States will not exceed its WTO limits.  Should the need
arise, a circuit breaker provision requires the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to adjust expenditures to meet URAA
domestic support ceilings.                                                                                                                                                        10
these expenditure levels under the 2002 Farm Act and compare them to levels encountered with
the 1996 Farm Act. 
10
Based on the 2003 USDA baseline projections, USDA Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2012,
rice prices are projected to remain low relative to the loan rate through 2007 (USDA, 2003a).
Rice prices are projected to be $3.82 per cwt. in 2003 and rise slightly to $4.18 per cwt. in 2007,
compared to a loan rate of $6.50 per cwt. during the 2003-07 period.  Consequently, support
through marketing loan benefits and counter-cyclical payments can be expected to be strong.
Non-recourse Marketing Assistance Loans--The new Act calls for a continuation of non-
recourse marketing assistance loans.  Their use is intended to minimize potential loan forfeitures
and subsequent government accumulation of stocks.  Under the 2002 Farm Act the loan rate
remains at $6.50 per hundredweight, unchanged from the 1996 Farm Act, with differentiation for
grain length (table 2).
Rice producers may repay the loan at the lower of the loan rate plus accrued interest or the
adjusted world price (AWP) computed on a weekly basis.  If the producer repays the loan at an
adjusted world market price, the difference between the loan rate and loan repayment rate is
referred to as a marketing loan gain and is considered a benefit to the producer.  Any accrued
interest on the loan is waived.
Producers may also decide to receive a loan deficiency payment instead of obtaining a loan.
This would occur when the announced world price is lower than the commodity loan rate.  The
LDP rate is the amount the loan rate exceeds the adjusted world market price.
Marketing loan benefits for rice over the life of the 2002 Farm Act, 2002-07, are projected to
average $603.5 million with a range of $545.9 million to $685.8 million (table 5).  These
projections reflect an adjusted world price projected to be less than the U.S. loan rate.
Projections of marketing loan benefits equal the U.S. loan rate of $6.50 per cwt. less the adjusted
                                                
10 More detailed information about the 2002 Farm Act can be found on the following website:
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/features/farmbill/).                                                                                                                                                        11
world price multiplied by the projected annual production.  In comparison, marketing loan
benefits during the 1996 Farm Act averaged $348 million during 1996-2002 with a range of $0
to $714 million (table 3).
Projected Marketing Loan Benefits under the 2002 Farm Act, 2002-07
Variable                                                                            Years
                                                        2002 1/  2003 2/  2004 2/  2005 2/  2006 2/  2007 2/
Loan rate ($/cwt.)                            6.50       6.50       6.50       6.50       6.50       6.50
Adjusted world price ($/cwt.)         3.25       3.60       3.71       3.82       3.93       4.05
LDP rate ($/cwt.)                            3.25       2.90       2.79       2.68       2.57       2.45
Production (million cwt.)              211.0     215.4     217.8     219.5     221.2     222.8
Marketing loan Benefits                685.8     624.7     607.7     588.3     568.5     545.9
1/ Estimates from 4/10/03 WASDE (USDA, 2003 c).
2/ Projections from USDA baseline (USDA, 2003 a).
Direct Payments—Direct payments for rice are available to eligible owners of rice base acres
under the 2002 Farm Act.  An annual agreement must be signed in order to receive these
payments.  Direct payments for rice are $2.35 per cwt. for each year, 2002-2007 (table 4).  These
payments are based on rice base acres, not current production and are paid on 85 percent of the
base acres. 
11  Base acres for 2002 are 4,139 and are assumed to remain constant through 2007. 
12
                                                
11  A question that has been raised is whether the ability to update base acres provides an incentive to continue
increasing acres planted to this crop to capture benefits under future rice programs.
12 Base Acres—Under the 2002 Act, landowners were able to update base acres if they desired.  One of two choices
must be made.  1) Update the rice base acres to capture a 4-year average of planted acreage plus “prevented from
planting” for the crop years 1998-2001.  2).  Use 2002 production flexibility contract payment acres as the new base
for rice and add oilseed bases using a 4-year average of planted acreage plus “prevented from planted” for individual
oilseeds during crop years 1998-2001.  The aggregate U.S. rice base is not likely to change much because the
existing base is larger than the average U.S. rice planted area for 1998-2001.
Payment acres—Payment acres for either direct payments or counter-cyclical payments are equal to 85 percent of
the base acres, which may or may not have been updated.   Payment acres for the 1996 Fair Act were also 85 percent
of the contract acres or base acres.
Program yield—Rice payment yields for direct payments are not changed from those used in the 1996 Act.
However, the rice payment yields for counter-cyclical payments may be updated during the signup period with one
of the following two choices: 1).  Add to program yields 70 percent of the difference between program yields for the
2002 crop and the farm’s average yields for the 1998-2001, or 2).  Use 93.5 percent of the 1998-2001 average                                                                                                                                                        12
Payment yield for 2002 is 4,814 lbs. per acre and is assumed to remain constant through 2007.
Direct payments from the 2002 Farm Act are projected to be $398 million annually, 2002-2007
(table 5).  Production flexibility contract payments averaged $425.9 million annually for the
1996 Farm Act, 1996-2002 with a range of $347.2 million to $479.3 million (table 3).
Consequently, the direct payments for rice under the 2002 Farm Act may average about $ 28
million less than the 1996 Farm Act’s production flexibility payments, suggesting a reduction in
“green box” support with the 2002 Farm Act from direct de-coupled payments.
Projected Annual Direct Payments under the 2002 Farm Act, 2002-2007
Payment Rate      Payment Acres         Payment Yield
( $2.35/cwt.  *  3.518 million acres  *  4,814 lbs./acre) =  $398.0 million
Counter-Cyclical Payments--are made to owners of a rice base when the effective price is less
than the rice target price of $10.50 per hundredweight (table 4).  The effective price is equal to
the sum of 1) the higher of the national average farm price for the marketing year, or the national
loan rate for the commodity and 2) the direct payment rate for the commodity.  The counter-
cyclical payment for a farmer equals the product of the payment rate, the payment acres, and the
payment yield.   Some producers may view these payments to be risk reducing.
Based on price projections from the baseline, USDA Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2012,
the effective price is expected to be less than the $10.50 target price during the 2002 Farm Act
and the farm price is expected to be below the loan rate.  Consequently, the maximum counter-
cyclical payment rate per year, $1.65 per cwt., is used as the payment rate.  The payment acres
are expected to remain virtually unchanged at 3.518 million acres.  The payment yield is
expected to increase by about 872 lbs./acre or 18 percent to 5,686 lbs./acre for 2002 through
2007.
The annual counter-cyclical payment for rice is projected to be about $330 million during 2002-
2007 (table 5), compared to an average annual ad hoc MLA payment made in 1998-2001 of
$391 million (table 3).  Based on these projections, annual counter-cyclical payments for rice are
                                                                                                                                                            
yields.   If there is a year when the actual yield is less than the county average, the yield will be 75 percent of the
county average.  The expectation that yields may be updated under future farm legislation could create an incentive
for increasing yields.                                                                                                                                                        13
expected to average somewhat less than average ad hoc MLA payments for rice.  Implications
for the AMS will depend on how CCPs are notified to the WTO.  
13  
 Projected Maximum Annual Counter-Cyclical Payments under the 2002 Farm Act, 2002-2007
                       Payment Rate       Payment Acres        Payment Yield
   (2002 Farm Act $1.65/cwt.  *  3.518 million acres  * 5,686 lbs./acre) =  $330.1 million
Doha Development Agenda and Global Domestic Support for Rice
During November 2001, more than 140 WTO member nations agreed to launch a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations.  These negotiations, called the Doha Development Agenda, seek
to reduce and possibly phase out all forms of export subsidies, improve market access, and
reduce trade-distorting domestic support.  These upcoming negotiations could expand global
markets and reduce trade barriers.  An agreement on the modalities for cuts in farm subsidies,
tariffs, and export subsidies was to have been completed by March 31, 2003, but this has been
delayed.
Reducing the AMS for agriculture with the URAA had a limited effect on rice production in
developing Asian countries, which account for the bulk of global rice production.  Two reasons
account for this limited effect.  First, the URAA allowed developing countries “special and
differential” exemptions for certain input and investment subsidies, which cover most programs
used to support rice production in these countries.  Second, trade-distorting domestic support
measures are not counted in a developing country’s AMS if the commodity’s “amber box”
expenditure does not exceed 10 percent of the commodity’s value of production, the developing
country “de minimis” provision.  Furthermore, some developed countries, such as Japan, have
experienced limited production effects due mostly to policy “re-instrumentation”.
The new round of negotiations have brought attention to the trade-distorting domestic support
policies of developed countries, such as the EU, Japan, and the U.S.  Developed countries
                                                                                                                                                            
13   As of May 5, 2003, the United States has not notified CCPs to the WTO.  It is not clear how CCPs will be
notified to the WTO.                                                                                                                                                        14
account for virtually all “amber” box domestic support expenditures, as well as most export
subsidies.  Currently, the U.S. AMS ceiling is $19.1 billion compared to the EU’s AMS ceiling
of about $60 billion and Japan’s ceiling of $30 billion. Given the increased level of global
concern over the potential for increased U.S. domestic support, how does the U.S. domestic
support for rice compare to other member countries rice support?
Countries with  “amber box” expenditures on rice in 1998 included Brazil, Colombia, the EU,
Mexico, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela (table 6).
14  However, only Colombia, the EU, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand included rice in their
AMS (table 6).  Rice comprised a large portion of the AMS for South Korea and Thailand,
nearly 80 percent, but rice was small or non-existent in 1998 for the EU, Japan, or the United
States.   “Amber box” support for countries such as Brazil, the EU, South Korea, and Thailand
exceeded U.S. levels for 1998.  However, because of declining prices, “amber box” support for
U.S. rice rose in 1999 (table 7).
Based on the current negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda, future domestic support
appears focused on two types: exempt (no or minimal trade distortion) support and reduced non-
exempt (production and trade-distortion) support.  Some proposals call for further reduction of
the AMS with implementation to occur over a number of years.  Other proposals call for
commodity specific reductions in “amber box” policies.  Some proposals are calling for the
reduction of the “de minimis” provision.  Lastly, there is a call for the reduction of the “blue
box” and merger with the AMS.
Scenario analysis suggests that reductions in marketing loan benefits could affect U.S. rice
producers and rice sector revenues (table 8).  Impacts are sensitive to both sizes of reduction and
implementation period.  If rice’s marketing loan benefits are reduced by 25 percent from
projected levels for 2002-07 and assuming no change in production or price, average annual
revenue to the U.S. rice sector could decline by 4 percent with a 6-year implementation period or
by 7 percent with a no phase-in period (table 8, scenario I).  Alternatively, if rice’s marketing
loan benefits are reduced by 50 percent from projected levels for 2002-07 and assuming no                                                                                                                                                        15
change in production or price, average annual revenue to the U.S. rice sector could decline by 8
percent with a 6-year implementation period or by 14 percent with a no phase-in period (table 8,
scenario II).  Lastly, if rice’s marketing loan benefits are reduced by 100 percent from projected
levels for 2002-07 and assuming no change in production or price, average annual revenue to the
U.S. rice sector could decline by 15 percent with a 6-year phase-in period or by 27 percent with a
no phase-in period (table 8, scenario III).
Summary and Conclusions
Government support to U.S. rice producers represents a major source of revenue, comprising 50
percent or greater of sector revenue in each of the past four crop years, 1999-2002. The 1996
Farm Act focused on planting flexibility with a reduced safety net.  Government support was in
the form of marketing loan benefits, de-coupled production flexibility contract payments, crop
and revenue insurance subsidies, ad hoc market loss assistance payments, and export assistance
programs. The 2002 Farm Act continues programs from the 1996 Farm Act with direct payments
replacing production flexibility contract payments and counter-cyclical payments replacing ad
hoc market loss assistance payments.  Crop and revenue insurance subsidies continue under
different legislation.
Rice contributed $435 million to the U.S. AMS in 1999 with marketing loan benefits accounting
for most of these “amber box” expenditures.  Marketing loan benefits continued to rise in crop
years 2000/01, 2001/02, and 2002/03 because of declining market prices.
Assuming continued low prices, income support from the 2002 Farm Act is expected to exceed
support provided during the years of 1996-02.  Projected annual average total support is $1.3
billion for 2002-07 compared to an annual average of $1.0 billion for 1996-02.  Marketing loan
benefits are expected to account for the rise in expenditures with slight declines in direct
payments and counter-cyclical payments.  Projected annual average payments equal 60 percent
of total sector revenue in 2002-07 compared to 43 percent in the prior period of 1996-02.
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Support for the U.S. rice sector is likely to become highly scrutinized due to the U.S.’s AMS
commitments under the WTO.  The current AMS for the U.S. is $19.1 billion and will remain at
this level until a new WTO agreement is reached.  A new WTO agreement is expected to further
reduce trade-distorting domestic support levels in either an aggregate or commodity specific
approach.  Hypothetical scenarios of reduced marketing loan benefits suggest that projected
annual average revenue (2002-07) for the U.S. rice sector could decline by 4 to 27 percent.  With
less government support, rice production could decline in the U.S. as well as other countries such
as Brazil, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand.
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Figure 1: U.S. Rice Sector: Sources of Revenue, 1991/92—2002/03
August-July marketing year.  2002/03 projected.
Source:  Economic Research Service and Farm Service Agency, USDA.
               Figure 2: Price Received by U.S. Producers, Loan Rate, and Announced
.
2001=estimate.  2002= projection as of 4/10/03
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Table 1.  Federal Crop Insurance Experience for U.S. Rice, 1995--2001.  
Year Planted  Insured  Percent of  Total  Premium  Producer Net 
Area  Area participation Premium  Subsidy Premium Indemnity Indemnity
                                                                                                                                                                           
Percent
1995 3.1 3 96.8 11.9 8.9 3.1 5.4 2.3
1996 2.8 1.9 67.9 10.1 7.4 2.7 1.6 -1.1
1997 3.1 1.7 54.8 12.2 8.5 3.7 8.5 4.8
1998 3.3 2 60.6 16.5 11.7 4.7 14.1 9.4
1999 3.5 2.6 74.3 32.1 19.4 12.6 53.7 41.1
2000 3.1 2.3 74.2 20.4 11.9 8.4 11.7 3.3
2001 3.3 2.5 75.8 19.8 13.4 6.4 13.8 7.4
2002 3.2 2.4 75.0 19.3 12.5 6.8 14.8 8
Source:  USDA, Economic Research Service
Million Acres Million Dollars
Table 2.  U.S. Amber Box Support for Rice and the AMS, 1995-99.  
  
Amber Box   Value of U.S. 5 Percent of Rice's  U.S. Total 
Crop Year Support  Rice Production Production  Contribution AMS 
  Value to U.S. Total  Commitment 
      AMS 
Bil. U.S. Dollars
1995   11.6 1,514.3 75.7     0.0 23.1
           
1996     5.8 1,687.4 84.4     0.0 22.3
           
1997     6.4 1,756.1 87.8     0.0 21.5
           
1998   20.8 1,686.6 84.3     0.0 20.7
1999   1/ 435.0 1,231.2 61.6 435.0 19.9
           
1/ 1999 is the latest WTO notification.         
Source: WTO country notifications. 
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Table 4.  Selected Policy Parameters Under the 2002 Farm Act
Direct payment
         Target prices rates          Loan rates
Commodity 2002-2003 2004-2007 2002-07 2002-2003 2004-2007
Rice ($/cwt.) 10.50 10.50 2.35 6.50 6.50
Wheat ($/bu.) 3.86 3.92 0.52 2.80 2.75
Corn ($/bu.) 2.60 2.63 0.28 1.98 1.95
Grain sorghum ($/bu.) 2.54 2.57 0.35 1.98 1.95
Barley ($/bu.) 2.21 2.24 0.24 1.88 1.85
Oats ($/bu.) 1.40 1.44 0.024 1.35 1.33
Upland cotton ($/lb.) 0.724 0.724 0.0667 0.52 0.52
Soybeans ($/bu.) 5.80 5.80 0.44 5.00 5.00
Peanuts ($/ton) 495 495 36 355 355
Table 3.  U.S. Rice Sector Income Support Payments under the 1996 Farm Act, 1996-2002.  
1996 1997 1998 1999     2000 1/    2001 1/     2002 1/
Million Dollars
Production Flexibility Contract  455.3 448.4 479.3 465.6 433.1 352.3 347.2
     Payments 
Market Loss Assistance  0.0 0.0 238.0 464.7 463.8 397.5 0.0
Loan Deficiency Payments  0.0 0.0 1.0 160.7 278.8 309.1 263.8
Marketing Loan Gains 0.0 0.0 13.1 183.0 150.3 199.1 142.3
Certificate Gains  0.0 0.0 0.0 57.0 169.3 205.5 303.3
Total Payments  455.3 448.4 731.4 1,331.0 1,495.3 1,463.5 1,056.6
 
Value of Production  1,690.3 1,756.1 1,687.0 1,231.2 1,050.0 914.9 864.9
Total Sector Revenue 2,145.6 2,204.5 2,418.4 2,562.2 2,545.3 2,378.4 1,921.5
1/  Estimated based on 3/11/03 WASDE. 
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Table 6.  Amber and Blue Box Support for Rice by WTO Member Country, 1998. 
  
Amber Box   Amber Box   Rice  Blue Box  Total Amber 
Expenditures Expenditures Contribution Expenditures and Blue Box 
minus de minimis to the AMS    Expenditures
  exemption     
Percent 
Brazil 26.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.4
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Colombia  4.7 4.7 1.2 0.0 4.7
European Union 478.0 478.0 0.1 89.0 567.0
 
Japan   0.0 0.0 0.0 392.0 392.0
Mexico  5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0
Philippines    8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0
South Korea  1,077.0 1,077.0 77.4 0.0 1,077.0
        
Thailand   394.0 394.0 78.9 0.0 394.0
Turkey   13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3
United States  20.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.8
Venezuela 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
      Total                            2,027.2 1,958.7 481.0 2,508.2
Source:  WTO country notifications. 
----Mil. U.S. Dollars----  ----Mill. U.S. Dollars----  
Table 5.  Projected U.S. Rice Sector Income Support Payments under the 2002 Farm Act, 2002-07.    
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
       Million Dollars
Direct Payments   398.0 398.0 398.0 398.0 398.0 398.0
 
Counter-Cyclical Payments   330.1 330.1 330.1 330.1 330.1 330.1
Marketing Loan Benefits  1/   685.8 624.7 607.7 588.3 568.5 545.9
Total Payments    1,413.9 1,352.8 1,335.8 1,316.4 1,296.6 1,274.0
Value of Production   864.9 822.8 845.1 867.0 895.9 931.3
Total Sector Revenue   2,278.8 2,175.6 2,180.9 2,183.4 2,192.5 2,205.3
1/  Projections for marketing loan benefits relied on 4/10/03 WASDE for 2002 and the USDA  
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Table 7.  Amber box Support for Rice by WTO Member Country, 1995-99.
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Countries Million U.S. Dollars
Brazil 109.9 46.7 21.7 26.4           N/N
Chile 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0
Colombia 15.0 0.0 3.0 5.0 4.0
European Union 653.0 649.0 576.0 478.0 391.1
Japan 27,597.0 22,705.0 19,540.0 0.0   0.0
Mexico 6.0 3.0 3.0 5.0           N/N
Philippines 10.0 33.0 21.0 8.0 94.2
South Korea 2,614.0 2,374.0 1,981.0 1,077.0 1,264.0
Thailand 352.0 498.0 299.0 394.0           N/N
Turkey 0.0 9.5 11.1 13.3 12.0
United States 11.6 5.8 6.4 20.8 435.0
Venezuela 529.0 161.0 227.0           N/N           N/N
Total 31,897.8 26,485.3 22,689.4 2,027.5 2,200.3
N/N = WTO was not notified.
Source: WTO, TN/AG/S4, March 20, 2002 and WTO country notifications.                                                                                                                                                          24
Table 8. Effects of Alternative Marketing Loan Benefit Reduction Scenarios to the U.S. Rice Sector.  
     Years
 Scenarios   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Avg. 2002-07
Million U.S. Dollars
Projected Marketing Loan Benefits  1/ 685.8 624.7 607.7 588.3 568.5 545.9 603.5
Scenario I.   Reduce Projected Marketing Loan Benefits for 2002-07 by 25 %. 
A.  Phased in over 6 years.
Reduced marketing loan benefits 657.3 572.7 531.9 490.4 450.3 409.4 518.7
Reduction to Projected MLBs 28.5 52.0 75.8 97.9 118.2 136.5 84.8
B.  No phase-in period.
Reduced marketing loan benefits 514.4 468.5 455.8 441.2 426.4 409.4 452.6
Reduction to Projected MLBs 171.5 156.2 151.9 147.1 142.1 136.5 150.9
 
Scenario II.  Reduce Projected Marketing Loan Benefits for 2002-07 by 50 %.  
A.  Phased in over 6 years. 
Reduced marketing loan benefits  628.7 520.6 455.8 392.3 331.7 273.0 433.7
Reduction to Projected MLBs 57.1 104.1 151.9 196.0 236.8 273.0 169.8
B.  No phase-in period.
Reduced marketing loan benefits 342.9 312.35 303.85 294.15 284.25 272.95 301.7
Reduction to Projected MLBs 342.9 312.35 303.85 294.15 284.25 272.95 301.7
Scenario III.  Reduce Projected Marketing Loan Benefits for 2002-07 by 100%.  
A.  Phased in over 6 years.  
Reduced marketing loan benefits 571.5 416.5 303.9 196.1 94.8 0.0 263.8
Reduction to Projected MLBs 114.3 208.2 303.8 392.2 473.7 545.9 339.7
B.  No phase-in period. 
Reduced marketing loan benefits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Reduction to Projected MLBs 685.8 624.7 607.7 588.3 568.5 545.9 603.5
1/  Taken from table 5. 